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BENNETT v. ANGELONE
92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
A Virginia jury convicted Ronald B. Bennett of capital murder in
the course of a robbery with a deadly weapon. 1 Upon finding vileness as
an aggravating factor, the jury sentenced him to death.
2
Bennett became a suspect in the murder of Anne Vaden after his
estranged wife gave one of the victim's rings to a friend whose ex-
husband was a former California parole officer. At trial, Mrs. Bennett
testified that on the night of the murder, her husband returned home
covered with blood and later confessed the murder to her. The coroner
concluded that despite the infliction of blows to the head, strangulation
and multiple stab wounds, Vaden survived the attack and later died of
blood loss.
3
In his opening statement, the prosecutor described Anne Vaden as
a class valedictorian, pa graduate of The College of William and Mary, a
guest minister and "business woman of the year."4 During the sentenc-
ing trial, the prosecutor made several religiously loaded statements
while attempting to harmonize the death penalty with biblical passages.
He also commented on Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby and a Muslim
sect which carried out a series of murders in 1977.
5
Bennett exhausted his direct appeals. The United States Supreme
Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. On state collateral
review, the Supreme Court of Virginia rejected many of Bennett's
substantive claims of trial error as procedurally barred by his failure to
raise them on direct appeal. The Supreme Court of Virginia also
dismissed his ineffective assistance of counsel claims on their merits.
After the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, Bennett filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court. The district
court held that most of Bennett's claims were procedurally defaulted and
denied relief. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,




Finding no error in the district court's dismissal of Bennett's
claims, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of relief.
7
ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
The court of appeals first considered whether the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act (ATEDA) limited its scope of review.8
Section 107(a) of ATEDA requires federal courts to give greater
deference to the decisions of state courts in capital cases on federal
1 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4).
2 Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336 (4th Cir. 1996).
3 Id. at 1340-41.
4 Id. at 1348.
5 Id. at 1341.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1350.
8 Id. at 1341. For a detailed discussion of this act, see, Raymond,
The Incredible Shrinking Writ: Habeas Corpus under the Anti-Terror-
ism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Capital Defense Journal,
this issue.
9 Id. at 1342.
habeas review if states meet certain requirements on state collateral
review. The court of appeals held this provision was not applicable in this
case because the Supreme Court of Virginia denied Bennett's state
habeas petition before the Virginia Legislature enacted a law providing
indigents with assistance of counsel in post-conviction proceedings. 9
Thus, the question remains whether Virginia's grant of post-petition
assistance of counsel, Va. Code Ann. §§ 19.3-163.7 and 19.3-163.8,
meets the ATEDA requirements in other cases. The court did not decide
whether §§ 101 through 106, which referred to habeas petitions gener-
ally, retroactively applied to Bennett's petition because the court held it
would also deny the petition under pre-ATEDA law. 10
Bennett raised four substantive issues based on errors at the guilt and
sentencing phases of his jury trial. These substantive issues included: 1)
the Commonwealth's improper use of "victim impact" statements at the
guiltphase; 2) the prosecutor's improper closing argument at the sentenc-
ing phase; 3) the defective nature of the jury instructions used at
sentencing; and 4) the unconstitutional vagueness of the "vileness"
aggravating factor under Virginia law. Bennett claimed that each of these
issues constituted a violation of due process and that his counsel's failing
to object to these errors amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel.11
I. Substantive Issues as Due Process Violations
A. Procedurally Defaulted Claims
The court held that Bennett procedurally defaulted his substantive
challenges to the prosecutor's opening statement and to the jury instruc-
tions because he failed to raise these issues on direct appeal and only
raised them for the first time on state habeas. 12 The court of appeals then
held that Bennett's default of the claims in state court constituted a
procedural bar to further federal review. 
13
Bennett did not raise his challenges to the prosecutor's inflamma-
tory arguments at the sentencing stage and the constitutionality of
Virginia's "vileness" factor until his federal habeas petition.14 Under
Bassette v. Thompson, 15 a federal habeas petitioner cannot raise a claim
in a federal habeas petition that he has never brought in any state court. 
16
Yet, the court of appeals suggested that, under the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Beam v. Paskett,17 Bennett might not
have lost these claims because they were the kind of claims required by
statute to be heard as part of the mandatory review by the state supreme
court. The court declined to decide whether Bennett's claims fit within
the scope of the statutory review because it found the claims to be
meritless. 18
10 Id. at 1342-43.
11 Id. at 1343.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 1344.
15 915 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1990).
16 Id. at 936.
17 Beam v. Paskett, 3 F.3d 1301, 1306 (9th Cir. 1993)(holding that,
under Idaho Statute, Idaho Supreme Court must consider possible errors
in sentencing that are not raised by defendant).
18 Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1344-45.
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The court quickly rejected Bennett's challenge to the constitution-
ality of the Virginia "vileness" factor because, in Tuggle v. Thompson,19
the court had recently upheld it as not unconstitutionally vague 2 0
B. Commonwealth's Religiously-Loaded Sentencing
Arguments Were Inflammatory, Irrelevant and
Prejudicial
Bennett alleged that the prosecutor's inflammatory use of refer-
ences to religious teachings at the sentencing phase rendered the trial
fundamentallyunfairanddeniedhimdueprocess. 21 TheCommonwealth's
attorney drew on his reading of biblical law to justify the morality of the
state's death penalty and to suggest the murder warranted a finding of
"vileness."'22 For example, he referred to Jesus, on the cross, telling the
Roman soldiers to give "those things that are Caesar's to Caesar and
those things that are God's to God."23 He suggested that the moral from
this passage was that citizens should "follow the law and leave the rest
to Heaven." 24
The courtheld that thesereligious arguments were indeed improper,
yet affirmed the denial of Bennett's claims. The court found that in the
context of the entire trial, the religious comments did nothave a sufficient
prejudicial effect to deny Bennett due process.2 5 The court stated that
there was no prejudicial effect because "there is little doubt that the
murder of which he was convicted was a particularly vile one."26
The court of appeals' analysis is questionable for two reasons. First,
the court erred in conducting its assessment oftheprejudicial effect of the
prosecutor's comments. UnderLawson v. Dixon,27 a court must consider
the trial as a whole to assess the prejudicial effect of a prosecutor's
alleged improper arguments. 2 8 Further, under Donnelly v.
DeChristoforo,2 9 the entirety of the argument must be considered when
judging a due process claim. Yet, because the court did not consider all
of the prosecutor's comments, it did not review the trial in its entirety.
The court found that Bennett was procedurally barred from raising
claims about other inflammatory remarks contained in the argument,
19 57 F.3d 1356 (4th Cir. 1995).
20 Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1345; See also, case summary of Tuggle,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 10 (1995); case summary of
Tuggle, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 8, No. 1, p. 7 (1995).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 1346. Counsel made the following argument:
Some will say that society shouldn't take a life because that's
murder also. That's not true. Vengeance is mine saith the
Lord, but later when he covered the Earth with water and left
only Noah and his family and some animals to survive, when
he saw the damage what [sic] had been done to the Earth, God
said "I'll never do that again" and handed that sword ofjustice
to Noah. Noah is now the Government. Noah will make the
decision who dies. "Thou shall [sic] not kill" is a prescription
[sic] against an individual; it is not against Government.
Because Government has a duty to protect its citizens. Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. Not only is this argument prejudicial and inflammatory, it is
inaccurate. Jesus did not make that comment to Roman soldiers, he made
it to a group of lawyers well before his crucifixion. See, Matthew 22:15-
21.
25 Id. at 1346-47.
26 Id. at 1346.
27 3 F.3d 743 (4th Cir. 1993).
28 Id. at 755.
such as the prosecutor's comparing Bennett's case to that of Lee Harvey
Oswald.30 It follows that the court could not have assessed the total
prejudicial effect of the prosecutor's arguments because it did not
consider all of his arguments, including these comparisons.
Secondly, in assessing the prejudicial impact of the prosecution's
arguments, the court apparently relied on its own subjective reaction to
the evidence in concluding that the murder was indeed vile. In Maynard
v. Cartwright,3 1 the United States Supreme Court held that an appellate
court cannot simply make a subjective determination of vileness based
only on its reaction to the facts of a particular case.
32
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Bennett made claims based on trial counsel's failure to object to
portions of the trial and counsel's failure to adequately explain mitigating
factors during the guilt phase. The district court dismissed these assign-
ments of error on their merits; therefore, Bennett's claims were not
procedurally defaulted.
33
A. Failure to Object to Improper Use of Victim Impact
Statements During Opening Arguments
In his opening argument at the guilt phase, the Commonwealth's
attorney gave a brief description of the victim.34 He told of her accom-
plishments, including her graduation as class valedictorian, guest minis-
try, and recognition as outstanding business woman of the year. Bennett
claimed defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to these
comments at trial. The court of appeals dismissed this claim because it
could not find that the prosecutor's statements were "genuinely im-
proper."35
The court held that under Payne v. Tennessee,36 the prosecutor's
use ofvictim impact evidence was notnecessarily improper.37 InPayne,
the United States Supreme Court held that use of evidence about the
29 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
30 Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1344. The court found that Bennett had also
procedurally defaulted his claims concerning the prosecutor's referring
to gruesome murders committed by the Hanafi Muslim sect and telling
the jury that it was "like a commander in the field of battle." Id.
31 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
32 Id. at463 (stating that Supreme Court in Godfrey v. Georgia, 446
U.S. 420 (1980), "plainly rejected the submission that a particular set of
facts surrounding a murder, however shocking they might be, were
enough in themselves, and without some narrowing principle to apply to
those facts, to warrant the imposition of the death penalty").
33 Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1347. The court of appeals held that the
defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his
ineffective assistance claims. Bennett failed to meet his burden under
Poynerv. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404 (4th Cir. 1992), in alleging "additional
facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief." Instead, Bennett only
pointed to places in the record that weakened the credibility of his trial
attorneys' explanation of their acts and omissions. Id.
Under ATEDA, defense counsel will find it even more difficult to
introduce new facts on appeal and in habeas proceedings. For a detailed
discussion of this act, see, Raymond, The Incredible Shrinking Writ:
Habeas Corpus under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Capital Defense Journal, this issue.
34 Id. at 1348.
35 Id.
36 501 U.S. 808 (1991).
37 Bennett, 90 F.3d at 1348.
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victim and the murder's impact upon the victim's family at the sentenc-
ing trial was not unconstitutional. 38 The Court found that evidence about
the victim assisted the jury in assessing the defendant's moral culpabil-
ity. Furthermore, the state had a legitimate interest in counteracting
mitigating evidence by reminding the sentencer that the victim repre-
sented a unique loss to society.
39
If evidence about the victim's character enters during the guilt
phase, such as in Bennett's case, the consequences are somewhat
different. Justice Souter, in his concurring opinion in Payne, noted that
some contextual evidence about the victim will unavoidably be intro-
duced at the guilt stage.40 Souter suggested in a hypothetical that the
testimony of a victim's daughter would inform ajury that the victim was
a father.41 Taking this concurrence into consideration, the court of
appeals held under its reading of Payne, that some background evidence
is admissible at the guilt phase and, therefore, the prosecutor's descrip-
tion of the victim was not clearly unconstitutional. Accordingly, Bennett's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel lacked merit.42
Even if the opinion in Payne stood for all that court of appeals
suggested it does, the prosecutor's comments did not fall within the
category of contextual evidence described by Justice Souter. Evidence
such as the victim's gradepoint average in college has no relevance to the
crime or reasonable relation to the facts the prosecution must use to meet
its burden of proof. The court of appeals' language that the prosecutor's
comments were not "genuinely improper" suggests that the court was
more concerned with degrees of impropriety than with the character of
the evidence as prejudicial and irrelevant.
The court of appeals accepted trial counsel's claim that objection
was not made in order to avoid emphasizing the Commonwealth's
discussion of the virtuous characteristics of the victim. The court held
that this was a reasonable trial tactic and, as such, did not render counsel
constitutionally ineffective.
43
The Supreme Court of Virginia requires that trial counsel object at
the very moment the offending words are spoken.44 Failure to immedi-
ately object will result in procedural default of an appellate claim based
on a prosecutor's improper argument. Not only must counsel timely
object, but counsel must object specifically to every part of the argument
that is offensive because, as of yet, the court has not recognized a blanket
objection to all inflammatory or prejudicial remarks. Furthermore,
counsel should phrase the objection on federal constitutional grounds to
preserve the issue for review in federal courts.
It is not necessary, however, to choose between preserving an
appellate issue and highlighting prejudicial materials before the jury.
Counsel could state she has an objection to the prosecutor's improper
argument and then ask to be heard on a matter of law outside the jury's
38 Payne at 827.
39 Id. at 825.
40 Id. at 840-841. Although Justice Souter wrote on the inevitable
introduction of some evidence about the victim in the guilt phase, the
court of appeals suggested that Justice Rhenquist included this idea in the
majority opinion. Bennett, 90 F.3d at 1348.
41 Id.
42 Bennett, 90 F.3d at 1348.
43 Id.
44 See, Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va 26,40,393 S.E.2d 599,
606 (1990) (stating that defendant's failure to immediately object to
improper argument resulted in procedural default).
presence. Once the jury has left, defense counsel could present her
objection to the specific prejudicial remark. It should also be noted that
this is an appropriate time to move for mistrial, or other remedy that goes
beyond a simple admonition to the prosecutor.
B. Failure to Object to Improper Sentencing Arguments
As discussed earlier, Bennett made several substantive claims
concerning the prosecutor's use of religious and "other-crime" argu-
ments during the sentencing phase. He also made an ineffective assis-
tance claim based on trial counsel's failure to object to these argu-
ments. 45 Defense counsel answered that they, as a matter of strategy,
decided not to object in order not to appear over-antagonistic to the jury.
The court rejected Bennett's suggestion that counsel's explanation was
a post-hoc fabrication and unworthy of deference. Instead, the court held
that refraining from objecting was a standard trial practice and not
constitutional ineffectiveness. 46
C. Failure to Object to Jury Instructions and Explain
Mitigation Evidence
The court of appeals, relying on its reasoning in Pruett v. Thomp-
son,47 held that counsel is not ineffective for failing to offer alternatives
to proper jury instructions. Consequently, Bennett could not base a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel on trial counsel's not objecting to, or
offering, alternative jury instructions and forms.
48
The court also found that trial counsel had in fact explained
mitigating evidence. In his closing arguments, trial counsel reminded the
jury of all the mitigating evidence and explained that the jury could
consider the evidence even though they had identified an aggravating
factor. Therefore, the court held that Bennett's claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failure to explain mitigating factors was
meritless. 49
Under Virginia law, jury forms barely mention mitigation evidence.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Virginia has held that it is not
necessary to explain mitigation evidence.50 Nevertheless, the inadequa-
cies of Virginia procedure regarding mitigation have yet to be reviewed
by the United States Supreme Court. These issues should be preserved.
Meanwhile, every effort should be made at trial to draw the distinction
between mitigation and excuse and to persuade juries through evidence
and argument that mitigation is a reason to impose a severe punishment
short of death. Counsel should also consider submitting jury instructions
and forms that further clarify both the nature and purpose of mitigating
evidence.
45 Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1349.
46 Id. at 1349-1350.
47 996 F.2d 1560 (4th Cir. 1993).
48 Bennett, 92 F.3d at 1350.
49 Id.
50 Mickens v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 395, 404, 442 S.E.2d 678,
684 (1994) (rejecting defendant's contention that Constitution requires
granting of jury instructions defining mitigating evidence, specifying
burden of proof for such evidence, and specifying how jurors must
consider such evidence.)
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II. Conclusion
The practical result of Bennett is depressing. The Commonwealth's
attorney acted unethically in his use of inflammatory argument at least in
that he did not "avoid any . . . conduct calculated to gain special
consideration."5 1 While he will never be punished for attempting to
51 Va. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-13. Other profes-
sional responsibility norms may also be implicated. Va. Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 7-105(C)(3) and (4) (In appearing in his
professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not assert his
personal knowledge of the facts in issue or assert his personal opinion as
to the justness of a cause); Va. Code of Professional Responsibility EC
7-21 (The expression by a lawyer of his personal opinion as to the
justness of a cause.., is not proper subject for argument to the trier of
fact); Va. Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-33 (Although a
lawyerhas the duty to representhis client zealously, he should notengage
in any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of proceedings); Va.
create unwarranted prejudice in the defendant's trial, the Common-
wealth will probably execute Bennett as the law requires, unless the
United State Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari.
Summary and Analysis by:
David T. McIndoe
Code of Professional Responsibility EC 8-10 (The responsibility of a
public prosecutor.., is to seek justice... during trial the prosecutor is
not only an advocate but he also may make decisions ... and those
affecting the public interest should be fair to all). See also, ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice 3-5.8(c)&(d) (The prosecutor should not
use arguments calculated to appeal to the prejudices of the jury. The
prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence); ABA Model Rules of
Professional ConductRule 3.A(e) (a lawyershall not in trial, allude to any
matter the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not
be supported by admissible evidence.., or state a personal opinion as to
the justness of a cause).
O'DELL v. NETHERLAND
95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
On February 6, 1985, Helen Schartner's body was found in a field
across the street from a nightclub which she and Joseph O'Dell had left
at approximately the same time the previous night. Schartner had died
from manual strangulation and had suffered eight head wounds which
had bled extensively. About two hours after leaving the nightclub,
O'Dell appeared in a convienience store. He was covered in blood. He
phoned his girlfriend who allowed him to sleep at her home after he told
her that the blood came from his own regurgitation. After reading about
Helen Schartner's murder in the local newspaper, O'Dell's girlfriend
went to her garage and discovered a brown bag full of bloody clothes
which she turned over to the police. 1
On October 10, 1986, Joseph O'Dell, who proceeded pro se, was
convicted of capital murder for the killing of Helen Schartner.2 The jury
found both vileness and future dangerousness and sentenced O'Dell to
death. O'Dell appealed, but the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the
trialcourt. 3 Subsequently, the Supreme Court ofVirginiagranted O'Dell's
petition for rehearing, considered and rejected a claim it had previously
found barred, and again affirmed his conviction and death sentence.4 On
October 3, 1988, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.
5
IO'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1218-19 (4th Cir. 1996).
2 Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(5) (killing in the commission of rape or
attempted rape).
3 O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 672,364 S.E.2d 491 (1988).
4 0'Dell v. Commonwealth, Record No. 861219, slip op. (Va. April
1, 1988).
5 O'Dell v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 871 (1988).
6 O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1218, 1219 (citing O'Dell v. Thompson, 502
U.S. 995 (1991)).
O'Dell next filed for a writ of habeas corpus in state court. His
petition, as amended, was denied. O'Dell again sought relief from the
Supreme Court of Virginia; however, he misnamed his appeal "Assign-
ments of Error" as opposed to "Petition for Appeal." Although O'Dell
attempted to correct his mistake, by then the time to file had expired.
Consequently, the Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed his appeal. The
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on December 2, 1991
with three Justices noting that the case "should ... receive careful
consideration." 6
O'Dell filed a federal habeas petition on July 23,1992.7 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia vacated O'Dell's
sentence. O'Dell argued that he was entitled to the benefit of the rule
handed down in Simmons v. South Carolina.8 Simmons held that a
defendant has a constitutional right to rebut the Commonwealth's
evidence of future dangerousness with the fact of the defendant's parole
ineligibility if sentenced to life in prison instead of death.9 To find for
O'Dell, the district court initially had to determine whether the doctrine
first announced in Teague v. Lane10 denied O'Dell the benefit of
Simmons. Teague held that, with narrow exceptions, habeas petitioners
will not be entitled to the benefit of favorable United States Supreme
Court decisions that impose constitutional obligations that state courts
could not have reasonably anticipated.1 1 In other words, if Simmons
7 Id. at 1219.
8 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994).
9 Id. at2193. Because of his priorrecord, O'Dell would have been
sentenced to life in prison, and he would have been ineligible for parole
under former Va. Code Ann. § 53.1-151. O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1220.
10 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
11 Id. at 310.
